Open Science and the ethos of science
Open Science and the ethos of science
Discussing the novelties and trivialities of open science
In a nutshell, what is meant by the ethos of science is adherence to four sets of institutional imperatives, namely communism (often also referred to as communalism, see Ziman, 2000),[1] universalism, disinterestedness and organised scepticism. Sometimes originality is added as a fourth norm, yet there is no consensus on whether its inclusion has actual merit. The institutional imperatives, often referred to as norms, were first outlined by the eminent sociologist Robert K. Merton, who conceptualised science as a distinct and largely autonomous social institution governed by a specific ethos (internalised to different degrees by individual researchers):
In order to understand the research enterprise, two aspects should also be taken into consideration. Firstly, the fact that non-academic science gains more ground within research enterprise and it is not governed by adherence to a common ethos; this state has been characterized as the rise of a post-academic system. Secondly, the ascent of information and communication technologies that enable the transition to open science. Due to that, it seems a plausible starting point of normative analyses of open science to ask how it relates to the ethos of science and to assess whether the envisaged transition can counteract post-academic tendencies, not least because they overtly contradict open science. To supplement the systematic philosophy of science analysis conducted by work package WP1 of the ROSiE project with a stakeholder perspective, the relationship between the ethos of science and open science was discussed explicitly in the third focus group and addressed implicitly in several other consultation formats investigating the normative basis of open science. In the following, key points of these discussions will be summarised.
While all discussants of the third focus group agreed that open science and the ethos of science are at least complementary and potentially mutually reinforcing, one participant (Research ethics committee (REC) member) — in response to a statement from a policymaker that open science, despite risks that require proper safeguards, is the only way forward if done right and the only way to fully adhere to the Mertonian norms — argued that open science could also be seen as a fad. Deliberately adopting an advocatus diaboli position, he elaborated that not following open science practices actually is not doing science in the sense of the ethos of science. As a result, open science cannot claim novelty but might be better understood as science without adjective, unless one conceptualizes science conducted in what he referred to as “a right economic environment” where research and education are not funded publicly and where free conduct of science is replaced by a competition-centred approach not as a derogation from what science should be, but as a normatively acceptable state of affairs. From that perspective, open science seems to reinvent the wheel, while it actually just refocuses on what science once was understood to be. Some other participants tended to disagree and stressed that changes in the research environment and technological break-throughs enable a new kind of openness and give rise to new challenges that go beyond changes in science-business or science-economy relations and that include new modes of science-society interactions, such as citizen science. Also, a participant stressed that arguing that open science is just science as it used to be is problematic because it leaves open to what time period the statement refers and disregards the several challenges researchers nowadays face that are different from typical challenges in the past. From this broader perspective, claims alleging a transition to something new seem indeed justified.
Besides, a participant (REC member) pointed out that the Mertonian norms also in the past referred primarily to an ideal to be realised by the research community rather than a description of actual research practices of individual researchers. He elaborated that due to this intersubjective community-focus, open science in a way always had existed, yet added that elements (such as data sharing) are new because they presuppose the existence of an enabling technological infrastructure. Another participant (REC member) stressed that many of his students as well as their supervisors seem driven by norms contradicting the ethos of science (especially the norms of interestedness and particularism) and, by extension, also open science, which he understands as reinforcing the ethos of science (a point of view shared by most discussants). He views open science as an important and urgent development that can help strengthen adherence to the scientific ethos if appropriate safeguards are defined and implemented that allow a proper balancing of goods (e.g., privacy and openness). Furthermore, it was pointed out by another REC member that structural problems (such as the strong competitive pressures many researchers currently are confronted with) create obstacles to change and therefore need to be addressed if the envisaged transition should succeed. Important questions in that regard that should be addressed, raised by the participant doubting the genuine novelty of open science, include who funds science; how legitimate rewards are created in the scientific system; how the relationship between funders, researchers and rewards should be structured; and how research should be made available and accessible. In this way, open science raises questions linked to benefit-sharing (i.e., questions related to how the community accesses benefits from science) and, ultimately, dignity in the science-society relationship as well as in the science community itself.
Notes
[1] Ziman, J. (2000). Real Science: What it is, and what it means. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[2] Merton, R. K. (1973). The sociology of science: Theoretical and empirical investigations. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
| This passage is part of D3.4: Recommendations resulting from the analysis of the consultation process written by Tom Lindemann, Lisa Häberlein, Philipp Hövel, François Jost. |